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POLICE USE OF CCTV SURVEILLANCE: 
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND PROPOSED 
REGULATIONS 
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with 
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tappings. 1 
The increasing use of closed circuit television (CCTV) surveil-
lance by law enforcement bodies confirms this prediction made 
by Justice Brandeis over half a century ago.2 While the first fully 
operational system suggests the enormous potential of the sys-
tem as an effective means of combatting crime,3 important con-
stitutional questions must be addressed before such systems are 
used more widely. 
This article evaluates the constitutionality of CCTV 
"searches." Part I discusses the present uses being made of 
closed circuit technology and evaluates the merits of the CCTV 
surveillance system. The critical policy trade-off is the system's 
effectiveness in combatting crime against the resulting loss of 
' Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Brandeis wrote: 
Id. 
Ways may some day be developed by which the Government, without remov, 
ing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it 
will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the 
home. . . . Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such 
invasions of individual security? 
Much later, the Court in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961), warned 
of "frightening paraphernalia which the vaunted marvels of an electronic age may visit 
upon human society." Justice Douglas believed that "[w)e are rapidly entering the age of 
no privacy, where everyone is open to surveillance at all times." Osborn v. United States, 
385 U.S. 323, 341 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
• Police departments in the following cities have used or are currently using CCTV: 
Chicago; New York; Hoboken, New Jersey; Tampa, Florida; Mt. Vernon, New York; Am-
sterdam; Berlin; Tokyo; and Paris. The Urban Mass Transportation Administration has 
financed several CCTV projects in underground subway stations. See CCTV: A Private 
Eye on the Public's Business, Student Lawyer, Jan. 1979, at 59. See also note 15 and 
accompanying text infra. 
• See note 9 infra. 
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privacy to individual citizens. 
Part II considers the constitutional implications of CCTV use 
in terms of three major doctrines: the Fourth Amendment prohi-
bition against "unreasonable searches and seizures"; the consti-
tutional right of privacy; and the First Amendment guarantees 
of free speech and association. This part briefly summarizes the 
state of the law concerning these constitutional doctrines. These 
separate doctrines are then applied to a hypothetical fact situa-
tion involving police use of CCTV surveillance. The conclusion 
is that current case law is inadequate to deal with the advanced 
technological capabilities of CCTV surveillance.' 
Part III advocates stringent regulation of police use of CCTV, 
despite the system's demonstrated and potential success in 
preventing crime, in order to stay within the constitutional pa-
rameters and to prevent abuses which unjustifiably intrude on 
the personal ·privacy of individuals. 
I. PRESENT USE OF CCTV SURVEILLANCE 
The private sector has made use of CCTV surveillance in 
shopping centers, hospitals, banks, and other commercial build-
ings.11 The first advanced system of CCTV surveillance, funded 
by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA),8 
• This idea that the law may not be keeping up with new technology has increasingly 
been expressed in recent years. Justice Brennan expressed his concern that "our course 
of decisions, it now seems, has been outflanked by the technological advances of the very 
recent past." Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 471 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
In Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49 (1967), the Court stated: "The law, though jeal-
ous of individual privacy, has not kept pace with [the] advances in scientific knowledge." 
See also Hearings on Surveillance Technology Before the Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. - (1975) 
(statement of Senator Tunney): 
Technological developments are arriving so rapidly and are changing the na-
ture of our society so fundamentally that we are in danger of losing the capacity 
to shape our own destiny. 
This danger is particularly ominous when the new technology is designed for 
surveillance purposes, for in this case the tight relationship between technology 
and power is most obvious. Control over the technology of surveillance conveys 
effective control over our privacy, our freedom and our dignity-in short, control 
over the most meaningful aspects of our lives as free human beings. 
• Police first used CCTV in 1968-69 to monitor public streets in Olean, New York. See 
Note, Police Use of Remote Camera Systems for Surveillance of Public Streets, 4 
CoLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 143, 143 n.1 (1972). See also N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1971, 
at 58, col. 4. 
• LEAA is a division of the Department of Justice which was created by the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701, 3711-3795 (1976). LEAA 
awards grants to states for the purpose of improving the criminal justice system. The 
states, in tum, award the funds to local criminal justice agencies. 
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was installed by the Mt. Vernon, New York police department 
in 1971.7 
In the Mt. Vernon system, police officers monitor the CCTV 
screens and can dispatch assistance immediately when anything 
unusual appears on the screen. The officer on monitoring duty 
can adjust the camera for a better viewing angle and focus on 
suspected criminal activity. The most sophisticated aspect of the 
system, however, is a technological break-through known as light 
amplification ability. This feature permits the system to be used 
at night, thus giving constant twenty-four hour sµrveillance. 8 
The Mt. Vernon system has been at least partially successful 
in deterring crime.9 Its success has induced the LEAA to make 
7 Mt. Vernon is a suburb of New York City with a population of 80,000. The street 
upon which the cameras are located is characterized by Mt. Vernon police as a high 
business crime area. The system consists of two cameras located a block apart. The cam-
eras are operated by remote control and are capable of a 355 degree rotation and a 120 
degree tilt. The system is equipped with a video tape machine, instant replay, split 
screen, and slow motion apparatus. The replay feature also permits an entire twenty-four 
hour surveillance period to be reviewed by a monitor operator in forty-eight minutes. 
The cameras themselves are in steel units with windshield wipers, windshield sprayers, 
heaters, and ventilating fans. See Chicago Tribune, Apr. 14, 1971, § 1, at 22, col. 3; TIME, 
May 10, 1971, at 46; T.V. GUIDE, Aug. 13, 1971, at 8. See also Heckel & Court, The Mt. 
Vernon Story: The World's First Police Operated LLLTV System, at 1 (undated 
mimeo), cited in Note, supra note 5, at 144 n.8. 
• Chicago Tribune, supra note 7. See also Note, supra note 5, at 144 & 144 n.10. 
The Mt. Vernon system is completely automatic, operating over a scene illumination 
range of 0.0001 (starlight) to 10,000 foot candles (bright sunlight). The picture on the 
monitor looks the same at night as it does in bright sunlight. Id. The LLLTV (low light 
level television) device gives a clear monitor picture, even in darkness, of automobile 
license plates over two blocks away. Chicago Tribune, supra note 7, at 22. During one 
demonstration of the system in a Mt. Vernon hotel, a dark barroom was shown on the 
monitor screen with LLL TV camera capability. By the naked eye no person could be 
made out in the bar but on the monitor screen the picture was as vivid as if the entire 
barroom had been brightly lit. Id. 
This day and night capability constitutes separate privacy objections. With the out-
dated infra-red or beam emission camera systems, one can see the source of the light 
amplification and deduce that he or she is being monitored. In contrast, the Mt. Vernon 
cameras operate on an LLL TV device which does not emit any warning to the observed 
subject. The subject may therefore be completely unaware of the nighttime surveillance. 
Id. For a discussion of the legal implications of surveillance aided by light amplification, 
see note 71, note 68 and accompanying text infra. 
• For a six-month period in 1970 during which the CCTV system was not yet in place, 
a total of ninety-nine street crimes were reported in the range of the camera surveillance. 
In a comparable six-month period in 1971 after the system was operative, the number of 
street crimes reported dropped to forty-nine. On the basis of this one-year decline, an 
evaluation of the project commissioned by the LEAA concluded that crime was reduced 
by better than 50% in the surveillance area as a result of the CCTV system. Note, supra 
note 5, at 146. Furthermore, the number of street crimes was reduced by 71 % for the 
first ten weeks of the Mt. Vernon project. T.V. GUIDE, supra note 7. 
According to Mt. Vernon and LEAA officials, deterrence is the chief reason for the 
system and apprehension is only a secondary goal. Note, supra note 5, at 146. Even so, 
the potent,ial use of CCTV surveillance as a .means of apprehension and/or courtroom 
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similar grants to other states.10 Despite this initial success, how-
ever, the cost of CCTV systems, particularly in smaller towns, 
remains an obstacle to further use.11 The non-economic costs of 
CCTV surveillance may also influence decisions regarding its 
use.12 
In 1973, local businesspeople and the New. York Times con-
tributed $15,000 for the installation of a CCTV system in New 
York's Times Square.18 The New York Civil Liberties Union 
protested. u Nevertheless, these public contributions are another 
evidence has not, however, been lost on law enforcement personnel. According to a police 
prospectus in Florida: 
The possibility of immediate apprehension of a criminal while in commission 
of a crime is the ultimate of evidence for prosecution. In the event immediate 
apprehension is not affected, then the [police] department would have video 
tape evidence of the crime and positive identification of the culprit while in the 
act of committing the crime. 
THE NATION, Nov. 23, 1970, at 520. 
For a discussion of the use of video tape in the courtroom as evidence to establish 
criminal conduct, see 20 DE PAULL. REV. 925 (1971). 
10 LEAA is funding CCTV surveillance projects in Hoboken, New Jersey; San Jose, 
California: Saginaw, Michigan; Tampa, Florida; Washington, D.C.; and Delaware. Note, 
supra note 5, at 150. Many states are proceeding even without help from LEAA grants. 
Indiana, Kansas, Georgia, Iowa, Hawaii, Texas, New Hampshire, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
and Alaska have all made provisions in their comprehensive plans for CCTV equipment. 
Id. at 150-51. 
11 In Olean, N.Y., officials terminated the system's operation after only one year of 
operation. Note, supra note 5, at 147. Local authorities believed that the high costs of 
CCTV were not justified given the infrequent street crime in the community. TIME, May 
10, 1971, at 46. Furthermore, the camera, which had no low light level capability and 
minimal telescopic function, did not record any criminal acts during the system's one 
year of operation. Note, supra note 5, at 147. 
In the Mt. Vernon system, however, the $47,000 cost for one year was not considered 
overly high. Mt. Vernon Police Captain Michael Court remarked that "it would take 
three men to patrol that area over a 24-hour period. That's $30,000 a year so in about 19 
months we break even." Id. 
11 Even if one were to assume equal effectiveness for CCTV and partol officers, other 
considerations may weigh in the calculus. See Note, supra note 5, at 147. It may be 
better to retain jobs than to cause unemployment. Furthermore, the psychological factor 
of human presence cannot be replaced by a glass lens. 
18 TIME, Dec. 31, 1973. at 15. The cameras are attached to lightposts on 42nd, 43rd 
and 44th streets. Police officers monitor the area from a trailer unit located within a park 
one block away. See CCTV: A Private Eye on the Public's Business, supra note 2, at 56. 
14 ACLU Assistant Director Barbara Shack warned: "Once you make a jump from a 
patrolman to technical devices, you're very much on the way to 1984." TIME, Dec. 31, 
1973, at 15. According to David Hamlin, former director of the Midwest Chapter of the 
American Civil Liberties Union, "[o]ur experience, especially in Chicago, is very bad as 
far as ethical police behavior and photographic techniques go. We want the police out of 
the surveillance business, not further into it." CCTV: A Private Eye on the Public's 
Business, supra note 2, at· 57. References to George Orwell's classic 1984 and the ever-
present Big Brother in the country of Oceania appear frequently in the CCTV literature. 
The idea of a faceless, unknown observer was taken to the extreme in Orwell's novel and 
depicted the system's effect on human behavior. The police use of the television surveil-
lance system in Oceania, as described in 1984, is strikingly similar in several respects to 
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indication of the perceived effectiveness of CCTV use in crime 
prevention.16 Other cities outside of the United States have also 
begun operation of CCTV surveillance units. 18 
Clearly, our major urban areas are using closed circuit televi-
sion surveillance increasingly as a means of combatting street 
crime. With rapid acceptance and rapid technological improve-
ment, CCTV surveillance may become as indispensable a part of 
police forces as squad cars. Yet, even though many communities 
favor police use of CCTV surveillance, serious constitutional 
questions must be confro,nted and answered before this Big Eye 
gets any wider. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF POLICE CCTV 
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS 
· Three major constitutional doctrines potentially control · the 
permissibility of CCTV observation by law enforcement person-
nel. The Fourth Amendment prohibition against "unreasonable 
use of present CCTV surveillance: 
There was, of course, no way of knowing whether you were being watched at 
any given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged 
in on any individual wire, was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they 
watched everybody all the time. But at any rate they could plug in your wire 
whenever they wanted to. You had to live-did live, from habit that became 
instinct-in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, ex-
cept in darkness, every movement scrutinized. 
G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949) at 7 (pt. I, ch. 1) (emphasis added). Note that with the develop-
ment of LLLTV capability, it is possible to have one's "every moment scrutinized" even 
in darkness. 
Modern technological paraphernalia which aid in the fight against crime and which 
enhance the nation's security are thought by civil libertarians to bring us closer and 
closer to the life described in 1984. Absent a complete prohibition of such technology, 
means must be taken to uphold basic constitutional protections. See Part III infra. 
For a contrary literary allusion dealing with the social impact of over-efficient police 
surveillance, see Niven, Cloak of Anarchy, Analog Mar. 1972, reprinted in L. NIVEN, 
TALES OF KNOWN SPACE: THE UNIVERSE OF LARRY NIVEN 111 (1975). Niven describes a 
time when all activity in a "free park" is beneficially subject to surveillance free from the 
"cop on the beat": 
"Twice the usual number of cops-eyes floated overhead, waiting. Gold dots against 
blue, basketball-sized, twelve feet up. Each a television eye and a sonic stunner, each a 
hookup to police headquarters, they were there to enforce the law of the Park. No vio-
lence." Id. 
16 A spokesperson for the Times Square business district said "(m]ost people I've 
talked to don't mind the cameras out there because they feel a little safer." TIME, supra 
note 13, at 15. People generally believed that CCTV made downtown safer. Id. Mt. 
Vernon residents strongly approved of thier CCTV project. See Note, supra note 5, at 
152 & 197. 
19 Tokyo, Berlin, and Amsterdam are presently using CCTV. Paris employs the largest 
system in the world with 150 street intersections monitored back at the station house. 
CCTV: A Private Eye on the Public's Business, supra note 2, at 57. 
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searches and seizures"17 is the departure point. The rapidly de-
veloping and expanding constitutional right of privacy also must 
be considered in evaluating the validity of remote camera obser-
vation.18 Finally, First Amendment protections must be ex-
amined in light of the "chilling effect" that police surveillance 
may have on freedom of speech and association.18 
A. Fourth Amendment Prohibition Against "Unreasonable 
Searches and Seizures" 
The practical effect of a judicial determination that a govern-
ment search is unreasonable is to exclude the evidentiary fruits 
of the search from the defendant's criminal trial.20 The Supreme 
Court has held that evidence will not be excluded at a criminal 
trial where the search and seizure was reasonably made incident 
to a lawful arrest,21 during a vehicular impoundment,22 in "hot 
pursuit" of a criminal suspect,23 by the consent of the defen-
dant,24 or at the country's border.26 The landmark decision of 
17 The fourth amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and ef· 
fects against unreasonble searches and seizures shall not be violated and no war-
rants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV. See Part II A infra. 
•• See Part II B infra. 
•• See Part II C infra. 
•• In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Supreme Court held that a 
search which does not satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment will result in 
the evidence of such illegal search being excluded at trial in the federal courts. The "ex-
clusionary rule" was extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (warrantless search of home by police officers re-
quired that the seized materials be excluded from appellant's trial). For a discussion of 
the recognized "reasonable" searches, see notes 21-25 and accompanying text infra. 
The majority of CCTV "searches" would not involve the securing of a judicial warrant. 
Because the use of CCTV in public areas is principally to counter street crime, there 
would be insufficient time to obtain a warrant in most cases. In addition, public use of 
CCTV for continuous monitoring makes discussion of a warrant moot since the "search" 
is already in progress. 
Accordingly, the operation of the CCTV system must be constitutionally validated 
prior to continuous monitoring. The constitutionality of the practice thus turns upon the 
court's evaluation of its "reasonableness" as a whole rather than with respect to specific 
periods of monitoring. 
" See Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 
56 (1950). 
" Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
23 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
•• Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
•• Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). 
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Katz v. United States26 eliminated the need to determine if a 
particular spot was ~ constitutionally protected one and devel-
oped instead the "reasonable expectation of privacy" doctrine. 
In addition, a search is reasonable if the evidence was in "plain 
view"27 of the police officer who was standing where he had a 
legal right to be. The Katz and plain view standards are essen-. 
tially distinct, although some courts have used the Katz stan-
dard to invalidate searches which would have been upheld on 
plain view grounds alone by finding that the defendant had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.28 
As a vehicle for applying these Fourth Amendment doctrines 
to the police use of CCTV surveillance, the following hypotheti-
cal scenario is employed. In a residential neighborhood with a 
high crime rate, the local police set up a sophisticated CCTV 
system by attaching a camera to a corner lamppost twenty feet 
off the ground. 29 The camera relays the view to a screen at police 
headquarters where a police monitor operator is in continuous 
twenty-four hour surveillance.80 
After the system had been operational for one year, 81 the 
monitor operator observed at 2:00 a.m.82 two persons on a patio 
behind a residence inhaling a white sustance which he believed 
was cocaine. The patio is enclosed by an eight-foot fence.88 The 
police secure a warrant on the basis of the monitor operator's 
18 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
17 See Part II A 1, infra. 
18 See note 77 and accompanying text infra. 
19 It is common practice in setting up a CCTV system to use existing public struc-
tures. For example, the Times Square system uses cameras attached. to lightposts at 
42nd, 43rd and 44th Streets. CCTV: A Private Eye on the Public's Business, supra note 
2, at 56. 
Attaching the camera unit at a point twenty feet off the ground raises the question 
whether it would be permissible for a police officer to climb a lightpost so that his view 
would be twenty feet off the ground. The system would more easily fit within the "inad-
vertence" requirement of the plain view rule if the camera were six feet off the ground, 
which would correspond to the view a police officer would have when standing on the 
street corner. For a discussion of the inadvertence requirement of the plain view rule, see 
notes 61-62 and acompanying text infra. 
•• For a discussion of the continuous character of the surveillance, as opposed to peri-
odic viewing or physical observation, see note 81 and accompanying text infra. 
•
1 The one year stipulation permits a presumption that the defendants knew that the 
camera was in their neighborhood. See note 50 and accompanying text infra. 
II The nighttime observation brings into play the light amplification ability of the 
CCTV camera units. See note 11 and accompanying text supra. The plain view ramifica-
tions of nighttime observation are discussed in note 71 and accompanying text infra. 
II The height of the fence, which would preclude the patio from being observed by 
passers-by, indicates the defendant's desire for privacy. See note 52 and accompanying 
text' infra. 
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observation34 and proceed to search the residence, where they 
discover large quantities of cocaine. The defendant now seeks to 
exclude the evidence at trial, claiming that it was obtained 
through an unreasonable search and seizure. 
1. The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard-
Prior to Katz, the Fourth Amendment prohibition against un-
reasonable searches and seizures applied only to "private 
places"; only a trespassory invasions were constitutionally for-
bidden. 311 This theory was based on Olmstead v. United States, 36 
in which the Supreme Court held that a telephone conversation 
intercepted outside of the defendant's house did not constitute 
an unreasonable search and seizure because there had been no 
physical invasion of the house. The "constitutionally protected 
areas"37 approach to search and seizure applied traditional no-
tions of property law to the rapidly advancing technology of the 
day. Under the Olmstead "private places" standard courts found 
no search if there had been no unconstitutional physical entry 
into the private place. 
a. The formation of the reasonable expectation of privacy 
standard. Katz expressly rejected the constitutionally protected 
areas/trespass approach.38 In Katz, the defendant was convicted 
of transmitting betting information by telephone. The govern-
ment introduced at trial evidence of telephone conversations 
which had been overheard by FBI agents using an electronic lis-
tening and recording device attached to the outside of the public 
telephone booth from which defendant made the calls. In hold-
ing that the trial court erred in permitting the use of this evi-
dence and that, henceforth, prior judicial approval must be re-
ceived before the government undertakes similar electronic 
surveillance measures, the Court stated: 
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. 
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in 
•• The police may obtain a warrant from a judicial officer to search private premises 
by establishing that there exists probable cause to believe a crime is being or has been 
committed. In United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932), the Supreme Court 
stated: "[T]he informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to is-
sue warrants . . . are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers ... who may 
happen to make arrests." 
•• Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
•• 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
37 Apparently, this phrase was first used by Judge Frank in a dissenting opinion in 
United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 314 (2d Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). 
•• For a discussion of the effect of Katz on the Olmstead trespass doctrine, see Note, 
Relationship Between Trespass and Fourth Amendment Protection after Katz v. 
United States, 38 Omo ST. L.J. 709 (1977). 
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his own home or office is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as pri-
vate, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected. 39 ' 
579 
The Court thus shifted the focus of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion away from property interests toward personal security.4° 
The standard which has emerged from Katz requires a two-
fold determination of the defendant's reasonable or objective ex-
pectation of privacy and the actual or subjective expectation of 
privacy. 0 If both of these requirements are met, any warrantless 
search by police is constitutionally prohibited.42 That is, the 
•• Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (citations omitted). 
•• Katz, however, did not eliminate the importance of property interests in determin-
ing an individual's Fourth Amendment protection. See Alderman v. United States, 394 
U.S. 165, 180 (1969), where the Court stated: 
Nor do we believe that Katz ... was intended to withdraw any of the protection 
which the [Fourth] Amendment extends to the home or to overrule the existing 
doctrine . . . that conversations as well as property are excludable from the 
criminal trial when they are found to be the fruits of an illegal invasion of the 
home. 
" Justice Harlan briefly explained the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test: 
"[T)here is a two-fold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjec-
tive) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
For a discussion of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard, see Note, 
Katz and the Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy or, A Man's 
Home Is His Fort, 23 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 63, 72-82 (1974) [hereinafter cited as A Man's 
Home]; Note, The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy - Katz v. United States, A Post-
scriptum, 9 IND. L. REV. 468 (1976); Note, The Post-Katz Problem of When "Looking" 
Will Constitute Searching Violative of the Fourth Amendment, 38 LA. L. REv. 635 
(1978); Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. 
REV. 154, 157-71 (1977). See generally O'Brien, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: 
Principles and Policies of Fourth Amendment-Protected Privacy, 13 NEW ENGLAND L. 
REV. 662, 704-12 (1978); Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy, and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 86 YALE L.J. 1461, 1469-72 (1977). 
•• Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967). Justice Harlan's two-fold test in Katz 
has been used by lower courts as if it had been part of the majority opinion. See United 
States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975); United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932 (1974); United States v. Hanahan, 442 F.2d 649 (7th 
Cir. 1971); United States v. Abbarno, 342 F. Supp. 599 (W.D.N.Y. i972); United States v. 
Vilhotti, 323 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 
452 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041 & 406 U.S. 947 (1972); Com-
monwealth v. Hemley, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970). 
Although no Supreme Court case has expressly adopted Harlan's "two-fold" test, it 
has been cited with approval several times. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court 
cited Katz in stating that "wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable 'expectation 
of privacy' ... he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Id. 
at 9. See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971) (plurality opinion) 
("Our problem, in terms of the principles announced in Katz, is what expectations of 
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Fourth Amendment prohibition applies where one reasonably or 
"justifiably" relies'8 upon freedom from government intrusion in 
the course of a particular activity. The standard also necessi-
tates a factual determination as to the defendant's actual expec-
tation of privacy under the specific circumstances. Both these 
questions must be resolved in favor of the defendant in order for 
Katz to apply. 
Katz made clear that even a public area such as a telephone 
booth can become private for a period of time so that Fourth 
Amendment protections are applicable." Since Katz, for exam-
ple, the clandestine surveillance of homosexual activity in public 
restrooms has been largely invalidated.411 Other recent cases indi-
privacy are constitutionally 'justifiable' .... "). Id. at 752. 
The Supreme Court has cited Harlan's reasonable expectation of privacy test fre-
quently in the course of discussing the applicability of the exclusionary rule to materials 
seized without a warrant. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 458 
(1977). (President had "legitimate expectation of privacy in such (personal presidential 
papers] ... Katz v. United States, ... "); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 (1974) 
(plurality opinion) ("we fail to comprehend what expectation of privacy was infringed."); 
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) ("No person can have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy that others will not know the sound of his voice"); Couch v. United 
States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 n.19 (1973) (defendant lacked "the necessary expectation of 
privacy to launch a valid Fourth Amendment claim") . 
.. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 353 . 
.. The Court explained: "The point is not that the booth is 'accessible to the public' at 
other times . . . but that it is a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants' 
expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable." 389 U.S. at 361. 
•• These restroom surveillance cases are particularly valuable in establishing contours 
of the Katz standard. The pre-Katz decisions uniformly held the evidence of deviant 
sexual behavior admissible in court where such activity could be observed by any mem-
ber of the public in normal use of the restroom. 
The typical fact situation in these cases involved use of a plainclothes police officer 
making normal use of the urinal or washing facilities. Where the toilet stall had no door 
on it, then the reasonable expectation of privacy standard would result in the officer's 
testimony being admissible at trial since the defendant could not possibly have enter-
tained any notion of privacy or freedom from public view. Thus, the same result was 
reached as when the earlier courts applied the plain view rule. See Part II A 2 infra for a 
discussion of the plain view rule. See Poore v. Ohio, 243 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ohio 1965); 
State v. Coyle, 181 So. 2d 671 (Fla. App. 1966); People v. Young, 214 Cal. App. 2d 131, 
29 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1963); People v. Norton, 209 Cal. App. 2d 173, 25 Cal. Rptr. 676 
(1962). 
The same result was reached in pre-Katz cases where the stall was enclosed and police 
conducted clandestine surveillance either from a vantage point above or through peep-
holes in the wall. Closed stall surveillance by police of homosexual activity was held 
admissible in Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 
U.S. 981 (1966), where the defendants were convicted of violating the California Penal 
Code prohibition against oral copulation. The evidence included a police officer's obser-
vation and photograph taken through a camouflaged hole in the ceiling over the enclosed 
public toilet. The court held that the surveillance was not an "unreasonable search" 
within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment because the police had reasonable cause to 
believe that the toilet stalls were being used in the commission of crimes. Id. at 257. 
Though acknowledging that "there is a right of privacy," id. at 256, the court went on to 
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cate that courts are ready to expand the reasonable expectation 
of privacy standard to settings in which the plain view rule 
would have clearly permiited such evidence. 48 
Katz has not yet yielded a clear set of workable rules. Subjec-
tive determinations by the factfinder have contributed to the 
ambiguity of the current rules. As can be seen in the restroom 
surveillance cases, 47 many courts continue to focus on one or two 
significant facts in applying the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy standard. This has resulted in a tendency to categorize the 
facts into legal compartments because the factual determination 
say: 
We also think, however, that the nature of the place, the nature of the criminal 
activities that can and do occur in it, the ready availability therein of a recepta-
cle for disposing of incriminating evidence, and the right of the public to expect 
that the police will put a stop to its use as a resort for crime all join tor require 
a reasonable limitation upon the right of privacy involved. 
Id. at 257 (emphasis added). · 
Circuit Judge Browning, however, wrote in dissent that "[p]ersons using the toilet 
stalls in the Camp Curry restroom did so with the reasonable expectation of partial pri-
vacy." Id .. at 260 (Browning, J., dissenting). Before Katz, resort to the "plain view" doc-
trine alone resulted in a lesser degree of Fourth Amendment protection than the "rea-
sonable expectation of privacy" doctrine provides. See notes 73-77 infra. 
State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 177 N.W.2d 800 (1970), was the first case involving 
police surveillance of public enclosed restrooms after Katz. 
In Bryant, the defendant was convicted of consensual sodomy on the basis of an of-
ficer's observation of the activity while stationed over a ventilator in the ceiling above 
the restroom. The court compared the instant facts with those in Katz and concluded 
that "surely [the reasonable expectation of privacy] applies here, where the facilities pro-
vided assure the user of privacy as much as a telephone booth does." Id. at 210-11, 177 
N.W.2d at 803. See also People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 
(1973) (observations by police officers of doo~less toilet stalls held unlawful even though 
defendant could have easily been seen by any member of the public who entered the 
restroom). 
See also Buchanan v. State, 471 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (surveillance of 
stalls with doors violated the Fourth Amendment). 
•• In State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d 1, 432 P.2d 64 (1967), decided the same year as Katz, a 
police officer obtained the permission of a motel manager to hide in the attic from where 
he observed defendant's criminal activity in the bathroom and bedroom. Even though 
the officer was in a lawful place, the testimony was held inadmissible. 
Other cases have found that the Katz standard will protect the individual who has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy even if the police are in a legal position. In Vidaurri v, 
Superior Court, 13 Cal. App. 3d 550, 91 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1970), the court in dicta hinted at 
an eventual retreat from the plain view doctrine: 
A person who surrounds his back yard with a fence, and limits entry with a 
gate, locked or unlocked, has shown a reasonable expectation of privacy for 
that area ... [and does] not give up [that) reasonable expectation of back yard 
privacy simply because a trespassing police officer might ... look over the gate 
into their yard. . . . 
Id. at 553, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 706 (emphasis added). See also Kirby v. Superior Court, 8 
Cal. App. 3d 591, 87 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1970) (the reasonableness of the police officer's 
search was affected by the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in his van). 
" See note 45 and accompanying text supra. 
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is framed in polar terms. 48 Such artificial categorization is at 
odds with the difficult taslc of carefully scrutinizing the relevant 
facts in each particular case in order to determine whether the 
defendant's belief of privacy was reasonable. 49 Although factual 
compartmentalization may aid judicial convenience, it does little 
for the evolution of a more generally applicable rule of law. 
b. The Katz standard applied to CCTV surveillance. One 
walking along a public sidewalk or standing in a public park 
cannot reasonably expect that his activity will be immune from 
the public eye or from observation by police. Where police use 
CCTV to observe such public areas there is no basis for a defen-
dant to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
In nonpublic areas, knowledge of a nearby CCTV unit would 
conceivably effect the reasonableness of one's expectation of pri-
vacy. An individual's expectation is based on belief or 
knowledge. If one knows that he or she is the subject of CCTV 
surveillance, then the Katz standard cannot provide protection 
because the individual had no actual, subjective expectation that 
his or her conduct would be private. The extent to which the 
government could manipulate persons to expect searches is not 
clear.110 The foregoing analysis leads to the possibility that Katz 
•• The Fourth Amendment search and seizure area contains several doctrines which 
illustrate this categorization technique. The technique first involves labeling a fact situa-
tion as one of several (usually two) types; which legal standard applies depends on how 
the fact is categorized. The reasonableness of warrantless searches and seizures de-
pended, at one time, on whether the searched area was "curtilage"-property within the 
immediate vicinity of the home-or "open fields." The latter was not given full Fourth 
Amendment protection. See, e.g., Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (the 
constitutional protection afforded to "persons, houses, papers and effects" did not ex-
tend to "open fields."). Such an approach reduces the tendency and the need for courts 
to scrutinize Fourth Amendment violations by examining the facts on a case-by-case 
basis. 
In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), the Supreme Court distinguished 
wiretapping surveillance on the basis of "trespassory" versus "nontrespassory" intru-
sions. Id. at 464-65. Where the listening device did not physically invade the "constitu-
tionally protected area," Chief Justice Taft reasoned that there had been no search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 466. 
•• The application of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard to a novel 
fact situation requires the singling out of several important factors in order for the fact-
finder to determine the defendant's actual and objective expectations. See note 42 supra. 
Initially, the fact-finder might inquire whether anything about the defendant or the way 
in which the defendant handled his or her property manifested a desire and/or an expec-
tation of privacy from visual surveillance. Delving further into this expectation would 
require evaluation of the possibility of visual surveillance of the defendant's activity and 
the type of physical area in which the expectation was claimed. Finally, the extent to 
which the police go beyond normal public observation should be considered in detennin-
ing the applicability of Katz. But see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (Court sug-
gests in dictum that the reasonable expectation doctrine may be contracted). 
00 Several cases have hinted that one's subjective knowledge of a police observation 
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could restrict rather than expand Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. Such is clearly not the intent of Katz; if it were, the gov-
ernment would be able to conduct a warrantless search of any 
person or property by announcing its intention to do so well in 
advance and making sure that the individual knew of the im-
pending search. 
The defendant in the hypothetical scenario presented earlier61 
could successfully prevent the police introduction of the cocaine 
at trial under the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy doc-
trine. He conducted himself in such a way as to manifest a de-
sire for and expectation of complete privacy.62 
The defendant's construction of an eight-foot fence on his 
property indicated his 
ness also indicated that the defendant did not want his actions 
to be observed either by members of the public or by police of-
ficers. In addition, the defendant's assumption that the minute 
particles of matter which he had laid out on the patio table 
could not be observed with unassisted vision was reasonable. 
The method of CCTV surveillance in this context is itself a 
factor in the determination of the reasonableness of the defen-
dant's expectation of privacy:18 CCTV, aided by light amplifica-
affects the application of Katz. In People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112 
Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974), police officers spotted stolen automobile parts in the defendant's 
back yard from a helicopter flying on routine patrol. The court held that the defendant 
could have no reasonable expectation of privacy because the police helicopter had regu-
larly patrolled the area "for some time." Id. at 839, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 765. The court 
further assumed that the defendant knew about the patrols. But see United States v. 
Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 905 (9th Cir. 1973) (dictum that government could not bypass 
Fourth Amendment guarantee by informing the public that all homes will be searched). 
Professor Amsterdam criticized this aspects of the Katz test by posing a hypothetical 
reminiscent of George Orwell's 1984 in which the government continuously puts notices 
on television that citizens are being subject to surveillance. Amsterdam, Perspectives on 
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974). In such a society no one would be 
free from intrusive governmental observation since there could exist no actual expecta-
tion of privacy. Several courts have avoided this restrictive construction of the "reasona-
ble expectation of privacy" standard by distinguishing between a person's actual expec-
tation and the right to have that expectation. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 
217 Pa. Super. Ct. 432, 272 A.2d 271 (1970) (student in college dormitory room had 
reasonable expectation of privacy notwithstanding his knowledge of contractual provi-
sion permitting university officials to inspect the room); Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 
284 (5th Cir. 1971) (citing McCloskey with approval). 
•• See text at notes 34-39 supra. 
"" For further discussion of what it means to "conduct oneself'' so as to manifest an 
expectation of privacy for purposes of fulfilling the subjective and actual parts of the 
Katz test, see A Man's Home, supra note 41. 
•• The nature of the defendant's premises also indicates a stronger expectation of pri-
vacy than if he had engaged in the activity on a public street or in his car. A patio 
attached to the house is within the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures of persons' "houses, papers and effects." U.S. CONST. amend. 
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tion and telescopic magnification, extends far beyond observa-
tion which would normally be made by the public. In the instant 
case, no one could have observed the defendant's activity even 
in broad daylight and without the fence because of the distance; 
the cocaine would not have been visible but for the extrasensory 
visual device. 
The foregoing application of the Katz reasonable expectation 
of privacy standard to the hypothetical scenario is illustrative of 
the process courts should use in ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence obtained by use of a CCTV system. The totality of the 
circumstances should be considered in determining whether the 
defendant's expectation of privacy in a given situation is reason-
able, and thus within the protection of Katz. 
2. The plain view rule-The plain view rule results from in-
terpretation of the term "search" in the Fourth Amendment.M If 
a police officer merely sees incriminating articles from a location 
where he or she has a right to be and makes no active attempt to 
uncover or find the articles, the officer may immediately seize 
the incriminating evidence.111 The rule is one of the well-recog-
nized exceptions06 to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment because police may seize evidence of illegal activity 
without prior judicial approval.07 It must, however, be "immedi-
IV (emphasis added) . 
.. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1971). See also Harris v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968). For a general discussion of the "plain view" rule, see 
Comment, Constitutional Standards for Applying the Plain View Doctrine, 6 8'r. 
MARY'S L.J. 725 (1974) . 
.. The plain view doctrine originated in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), 
where the Court held that a warrantless seizure of evidence by police is "reasonable" 
when the officer inadvertently discovers material of an "incriminating character." For 
the rule to be applicable, however, the officer must have prior justification to be in the 
position to have the view. 
An excellent description of this rationale was made in United States v. Davis, 423 F.2d 
974, 977 (5th Cir. 1970). The court there stated: 
The main consideration in applying the rule is to determine whether the observ-
ing officer had "a right to be in the position to have that view." Many of the 
cases involving the "plain view" doctrine concern evidence recovered from 
automobiles located in public places. The rule lends itself to application in these 
situations because the observing officer is not required to trespass on private 
property in order to have a clear view of articles inside an automobile. 
"" The other well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement are discussed in 
the text accompanying notes 21-25 supra. 
•
7 In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971), the Court stated: "It is 
well established that under certain circumstances ['prior justification' for view and 'im-
mediately apparent' evidence of crime] the police may seize evidence in plain view with-
out a warrant." (emphasis added). 
See also Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great "Search 
Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1047, 1049 (1975). Judge Moylan 
argues: 
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ately apparent" to the officer that the articles within his view 
constitute relevant evidence of criminal activity.118 
a. Parameters of the plain view rule. In Harris v. United 
States, 69 the Supreme Court held that the plain view rule ap-
plies only when an object or act is an inadvertent discovery, not 
when it is found after a deliberate search. 60 Most courts accept 
the inadvertent discovery requirement,61 although in Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire,62 only a plurality of the Court voted to uphold 
The plain view doctrine is a newly recognized exception to a fundamental pro-
position. That proposition is that "searches conducted outside the judicial pro-
cess, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions." 
Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). 
"" See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), where the Court stated: 
Of course, the extension of the original justification [in "plain view" cases] is 
legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have 
evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a 
general exploratory search from one object to another until something incrimi-
nating at last emerges. 
Id. at 460 (emphasis added). See also cases cited in United States v. Scios, 590 F.2d 956, 
974 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
•• 390 U.S. 234 (1968). 
eo In Harris, the defendant's automobile had been observed leaving the scene of a rob-
bery. After the defendant's arrest, police impounded the automobile. It began to rain 
and a police officer opened one of the doors in order to roll UP, the windows. He did not 
have a search warrant for the car. While rolling up the window he saw a registration card 
which bore the name of the robbery victim laying on the metal stripping below the door. 
The Court, affirming Harris' robbery conviction in a per curiam opinion, stated: 
The sole question for our consideration is whether the officer discovered the 
registration card by means of an illegal search. We hold that he did not. The 
admissibility of evidence found as a result of a search under the police regulation 
is not presented by this case .... [T)he discovery of the card was not the result 
of a search of the car, but of a measure taken to protect the car while it was in 
police custody. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain 
a warrant in these narrow circumstances. 
Id. at 236. 
01 See Comment, Inadvertency Requirement of Plain View Doctrine Disregarded 
Where Entry Made Under Search and Seizure Warrants, 12 Hous. L. REv. 232 (1974); 
Note, "Plain View"-Anything But Plain; Coolidge Divides the Lower Courts, 7 Lov. 
L.A.L. REV. 489, 508 n.129 (1974). 
81 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971). The majority held that a warrant authorizing an automo-
bile search was invalid because it was issued by the State Attorney General and not a 
"neutral and detached" magistrate. Only a plurality of the Court voted to uphold the 
inadvertent discovery requirement. Id. at 445, 453-73. Justice Stewart, writing for the 
plurality, stressed the importance of that condition in maintaining the true intent of the 
warrant requirement. Without it, he argued, there would be no incentive for policemen 
to seek a warrant in many situations and the extent of the search would no longer be 
limited to a" 'particular description' of the things to be seized." Id. at 467. (Stewart, J., 
plurality opinion). 
The uncertainty as to the requirement of inadvertence after Coolidge has led Profes-
sors Lewis and Mannie to warn that "the present status of the plain view doctrine may 
invite subterfuge seizures and false testimony by the police." Lewis & Man-
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the requirement. 
The inadvertent discovery requirement is essential to the 
analysis of CCTV surveillance. Without it, police could deliber-
at~ly place CCTV cameras with telescopic capabilities in posi-
tions which are legal, but where persons are not likely to be, 
even inadvertently.63 The plain view rule could thus be used, for 
example, to justify CCTV telescopic surveillance of an apart-
ment several blocks away so long as the camera unit itself is in a 
legal position.64 That is, if the viewer611 is legally permitted to 
occupy a certain spot, anything seen from that spot which estab-
lishes probable cause of criminal activity enables police to ob-
tain a search warrant. Where it is immediately apparent that the 
evidence viewed is illegal, it may be seized under the plain view 
rule without first obtaining a judicial search warrant.66 Accord-
nle, Warrantless Searches and the "Plain View" Doctrine: Current Perspective, 12 CRIM. 
L. BULL. 5, 24 (1976). 
For critical commentary on the effect of Coolidge on the plain view rule, see generally 
Landynski, The Supreme Court's Search for Fourth Amendment Standards: The Ex-
traordinary Case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 45 CoNN. B.J. 330 (1971); Comment, 
Constitutional Law - Search and Seizure - Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 6 SUFFOLK 
U.L. REV. 695 (1972). 
•• Evidence seized as a direct result of being viewed by a policeman from a spot in 
which he had no legal right to be is subject to the exclusionary rule. See McDonald v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), where the Court invoked the exclusionary rule to 
prevent a police officer's testimony as to gambling devices he saw over the top of a tran-
som in the defendant's bedroom after he had broken into the house. The officer did not 
gain the "view" from a position where he had a right to be See also Brock v. United 
States, 223 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955), where the Fifth Circuit stated: "Whatever quibbles 
there may be as to where the curtilage begins and ends, it is clear that standing on a 
man's premises and looking in his bedroom window is a violation of his 'right to be let 
alone.' "Id. at 685 (footnote omitted). 
84 A potential argument against CCTV surveillance is that the cameras are not in "le-
gal positions.'' Attaching the camera unit to a lamppost or the side of a building extends 
the requirement of "legal position" to the limit. If a police officer climbed a lamppost to 
better view the area, a court could decide he had a legal right to do so. If he accidentally 
observed unlawful activity in a nearby apartment as a result, he would be within the 
parameters of the plain view rule because of his legal position. See note 55 supra. 
•• An issue likely to arise in connection with the plain view rule is whether the 
"viewer" in a legal position can be remote-controlled camera. Because of· the Court's 
treatments of such technological devices as mere aids and substitutes for human effort, 
the camera unit itself, if attached to a spot where it had a legal right to be, would not bar 
use of the plain view rule. See notes 73-78 and accompanying text infra for a discussion 
of the courts' treatment of extrasensory visual aid devices. 
88 Street crime will constitute the bulk of illegal activity observed by a police CCTV 
monitor operator. In such situations there is insufficient time to obtain a judicial search 
warrant. Indeed, the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement all involve cir-
cumstances where the procuring of a warrant is impracticable or unnecessary. See text 
accompanying notes 21-25 supra. Since the activity has been directly observed by the 
monitor operation, plain view will justify immediate arrest of the suspect and/or seizure 
of the incriminating evidence. Although "exigent circumstances" may also be present 
which justify an immediate warrantless search and seizure, this article will not evaluate 
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ingly, the determination of whether the camera unit is in a legal 
position is an important first step in applying the plain view rule 
to CCTV surveillance by police. 
The second issue is the constitutionality of extrasensory visual 
surveillance devices as substitute "eyes" of law enforcement of-
ficers. Most courts make no distinction between techniques used 
to gain views. 87 The earliest cases of this type involved the use of 
artificial light at night or in dark places. 88 In United States v. 
Lee,69 the Supreme Court ruled that the Coast Guard's use of a 
search light to see a ship at sea was constitutionally permissible, 
stating: "Such use of a search light is comparable to the use of a 
marine glass or a field glass. It is not prohibited by the Constitu-
tion. "70 The law is the same one-half century later. Most courts 
that exception's application to CCTV surveillance because of the infrequent occasion for 
its use in CCTV surveillance operations and the much broader coverage of the plain view 
rule. For a discussion of the "exigent circumstances" exception to the warrant require-
ment of the Fourth Amendment, see Robb, The Carroll Case: The Expansion of the 
Automobile Exception in Warrantless Search and Seizure Cases, 11\ Wll.LAME'ITE L. 
REV. 39, 49-54 (1978). 
In some situations, however, where no immediate necessity exists for intervention or 
arrest, and the criminal activity suggests the presence of hidden illegal materiel, the po-
lice may opt to secure a warrant based on probable cause in order to conduct a broader 
search than otherwise permissible under the plain view rule alone. The ,police must have 
probable cause to believe that there is unlawful contraband in the possession or control 
of the defendant. In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949), the Court 
stated: 
[Probable cause] has come to mean more than bare suspicion: Probable cause 
exists where "the facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge, 
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information sufficient in them-
selves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in .the belief that" an offense has 
been or is being committed. 
The standard of probable cause has been attacked as the equivalent of mere suspicion 
by police officers. Others have expressed concern that a shift from probable cause to a 
mere suspicion test would grant unjustified discretion to police. According to Justice 
Douglas, the suspicion test "permits the police to interfere ... with a multitude of 
lawabiding citizens, whose only transgression may be a nonconformist appearance or at-
titude." United States v. Brignon-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 889 (1975) (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
One distinguished commentator believes that the suspicion test is really not a test at 
ell but simply constitutional permission for police to assess the facts as they wish. Pro-
fessor Admsterdam points out: "To say that the police may accost citizens at their whim 
and may detain them upon reasonable suspicion is to say, in reality, that the police may 
both accost and detain citizens at their whim." Amsterdam, supra note 51, at 395 (em-
phasis added) (citing Amicus Curiae Brief for the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense & Educ. 
Fund, Inc. at 56-57; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968)). 
•• See notes 72-73 and accompanying text infra. 
88 See, e.g., cases cited in note 71 infra. There is a technical difference between use of 
artificial illumination in the form of flashlights and similar aids which illuminate the 
observed area and LLL TV devices which illuminate the area on the monitor screen only. 
This distinction, however, is not likely to be legally significant. 
•• 274 U.S. 559 (1927). 
10 Id. at 563. 
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sustain use of artificial illumination on the basis of the plain 
view rule. 71 
To date the courts have treated telescopic surveillance cases 
as within the plain view rule. 72 The use of binoculars or other 
telescopic devices by the police does not affect the application of 
71 See Note, Police Use of Sense-Enhancing Devices and the Limits of the Fourth 
Amendment, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 1167, 1172-77 (1977). See also United States v. Johnson, 
506 F.2d 674, 676 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 917 (1975) ("The fact that the 
contents of the vehicle may not have been visible without the use of artificial illumina-
tion does not preclude such observation from application of the 'plain view' doctrine"); 
People v. Whalen, 390 Mich. 672, 679, 213 N.W.2d 116, 120 (1973) ("[T]he plain view 
rule does not slink away at sunset to emerge again at the break of day."). 
Many courts have allowed use of these visual aids on the ground that police need to 
view activity in the dark. See Dorsey v. United States, 372 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1976): 
We do not think the need to employ a visual aid at night in the form of a 
flashlight converts this from lawful to unlawful conduct. . . . If policemen are to 
serve any purpose of detecting and preventing crime . . . they must be able to 
take a closer look at challenging situations as they encounter them. 
Id. at 931. See also Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 170), where the 
court said, "[t]he plain view rule does not go into hibernation at sunset." 
Many courts in the "flashlight" cases have continued to require "inadvertence" even 
after Coolidge. These cases have, for the most part, relied on the Court's statement in 
Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968), that "[i]t has long been settled that objects 
falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that 
view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence." Id. at 236 (emphasis 
added). 
See also United States v. Cody, 390 F. Supp. 616 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), where police 
searched the defendant's car with a flashlight and found contraband. The court held that 
the seizure was illegal because the inadvertence requirement of plain view was not met. 
The court stated: "One of the limitations upon the application of this [plain view] doc-
trine is that 'the discovery . . . must be inadvertent.' " Id. at 617 (citing Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 449, 469 (1971)) (footnote omitted). 
71 See, e.g., People v. Vermouth, 42 Cal. App. 3d 353, 362, 116 Cal. Rptr. 675, 680 
(1974) ("Application of the plain view doctrine is unaltered by an officer's employment 
of artificial illumination . . . and we see no reason to invoke a different rule where the 
visual aid employed is optical.") (emphasis added). 
In using the plain view rule of uphold telescopic searches, most courts appar to treat 
the device as a mere extension of the viewer's own senses. See, e.g., Hodges v. United 
States, 243 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1957). In Hodges the defendant was convicted of illegal 
possession of a still. The search warrant which led to the seizure of his wares was ob-
tained by a federal agent's testimony based on activities he saw with the use of binocu-
lars in the defendant's chicken house. The court barely acknowledged the agent's use of 
binoculars and affirmed the defendant's conviction. 
The language of the Supreme Court in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), 
although dictum, has continued to influence lower courts and is noteworthy for its unam-
biguous treatment of extrasensory visual surveillance devices: "The use of bifocals, field 
glasses or the telescope to magnify the object of a witness' vision is not a forbidden 
search and seizure, even if they focus without his knowledge or consent upon what one 
supposes to be private indiscretions." Id. at 754. See also Note, supra note 71, at 1180-
81; Note, Telescopic Surveillance as a Violation of the Fourth Amendment, 63 IowA L. 
R.Ev. 708, 709 (1978); Comment, Police Helicopter Surveillance and Other Aided Obser-
vations: The Shrinking Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 11 CAL. W.L. REv. 505, 514-
15 (1975); and Note, Constitutional Law, Use of Binoculars as Constitutional as Unrea-
sonable Search, 27 OKLA. L. R.Ev. 254 (1974). 
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the rule. In clearly public areas such as downtown business dis-
tricts where CCTV surveillance is most often used, the Katz rea-
sonable expectation of privacy standard would not effect the re-
sult since one could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in that area. In nonpublic areas, however, many courts hold that 
where activity is in plain view of police there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy.73 These courts have often relied on Jus-
tice Harlan's statement in Katz7" that "objects, activities, or 
statements that [one] exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are 
not 'protected' [under the Katz test] because no intention to 
keep them to himself has been exhibited. "76 In addition, courts 
which deny the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy 
if the activity or evidence is in plain view make no distinction 
between an unaided view and a telescopic one. 78 
71 See United States v. Conner, 478 F.2d 1320, 1323 (7th Cir. 1973) (policeman could 
seize a stolen car because the inside of defendants' garage was visible from outside the 
building and "[u]nder these circumstances, the defendants had no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy"); United States v. Wilson, 472 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 868 (1973) (defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy when the door of 
his apartment was left wide open); Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621, 625 (9th Cir. 1969) 
("Ponce's reliance on privacy in his motel room was not reasonable under the circum-
stances. If he did not wish to be observed he could have drawn his blinds. The officers 
did not intrude upon any reasonable expectation of privacy in this case by observing 
with their eyes the activities visible through the window."); People v. Bradley, 1 Cal. 3d 
80, 460 P.2d 129, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1969) (warrantless seizure of marijuana plants from 
fenced yard upheld because plain sight by officer cancels any reasonable expectation of 
privacy); Wallace v. State, 84 Nev. 532, 533, 445 P.2d 29, 29-30 (1968) (seizure of mari-
juana from defendant's yard legal because plants were in plain view). 
Several cases apply the plain view rule in similar nonpublic situations without even 
considering the applicability of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard. See, e.g., 
United States v. Johnson, 506 F.2d 674, 675 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 917 
(1975) ("Under the 'plain view' doctrine, a plain view observation by a police officer from 
a position where the officer is entitled to be is not a 'search' within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment are not 
applicable."); Gil v. Beto, 440 F.2d 666, 666 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (police officers 
observed drugs through an open motel room window; held no Fourth Amendment rights 
violated when police officers merely observe what is in plain view). 
" 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
•• Id. at 361. Many lower courts have interpreted the language to mean that the fact 
that an activity is in plain view established knowledge or at least carelessness by the 
defendant that his activity would be subject to observation. On the basis of this analysis, 
simply leaving a window slightly open, a door slightly ajar, or a window shade partially 
up establishes that the defendant cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy. See, 
e.g., United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1078 n.15 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 
U.S. 921 (1973), quoting with approval State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481, 496, 181 A.2d 761, 
769 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 835 (1963) ("It is the duty of a policeman to investi-
gate, and we cannot say that . . . the Fourth Amendment itself draws the blinds the 
occupant could have drawn but did not."). 
" See United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 
(1974) (use of binoculars by officers to observe unloading of illicit liquor upheld on plain 
view grounds where there was no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circum· 
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Several courts have rejected the proposition that an individual 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy merely because his ac-
tivity was within plain view of police; this appears to be the 
trend. 77 Thus, the plain view rule would uphold the use of 
stances). See also United States v. Gimes, 426 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1970); People v. 
Crochen, 23 Ill. App. 3d 363, 319 N.E.2d 332 (1974). 
In State v. Thompson, 196 Neb. 55, 57, 241 N.W.2d 511, 513 (1976), Katz was not even 
mentioned in the majority opinion. In Thompson, the defendant was sitting in the living 
room of his home with the curtains drawn. By using binoculars, police observed a guest 
in the room smoking marijuana through a window in an adjoining room which was cov-
ered by a sheer curtain and partially blocked by potted plants. The court held that since 
the officer has a legal right to be in the alley behind the house there was nothing im-
proper about their use of binoculars to gain the view. 
The courts which have failed to find a reasonable expectation of privacy where the 
defendant's activity was in plain view of police officers using telescopic aids have not 
discussed whether the possibility of an observation unaided by telescopic devices is re-
quired. Thus, it is unlikely that these courts require the activity to be observable by the 
unaided eye. In most of the cases, an examination of the facts suggests that the view 
could not have been possible without the telescopic devices. See United States v. Min-
ton, 488 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974) (use of binoculars to 
identify cartons of illicit liquor); Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968) (use of binoculars to identify distilling apparatus from 
a distance of more than seventy-five yards away); Commonwealth v. Hemley, 216 Pa. 
Super. Ct. 177, 180-81, 263 A.2d 904, 906 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971) (use of 
binoculars to identify forms as football parlay sheets). See also State v. Thompson, 196 
Neb. 55, 241 N.W.2d 511 (1976); People v. Vermouth, 42 Cal. App. 3d 353, 362, 116 Cal. 
Rptr. 675, 680 (1974). In these two cases the court did expressly determine that an un-
aided observation was possibl!! but did not state that the absence of such an unaided 
observation would have resulted in the suppression of the evidence. However, even where 
it is expressly noted that an unaided view would not have been possible, courts have not 
excluded such evidence. See, e.g., State v. Manly, 85 Wash. 2d 120, 124, 530 P.2d 306, 
309 (1975) (trial court found that binoculars were necessary to identify illegal activity 
with reasonable certainty). 
For a discussion of a reduced expectation of privacy where there exists the possibility 
of telescopic observation, see Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Pri-
vacy Test, 76 M1cH. L. REV. 154, 168-71 (1977). 
77 See United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Hawaii 1976). In Kim, FBI agents 
used an 800 millimeter telescope to observe suspected gambling activities in defendant's 
apartment from a building a quarter of a mile away. The agents were able to observe the 
defendant making phone calls while reading the "J.K. Sports Journal." This information 
enabled the FBI to procure a wiretap on the defendant's phone. The defendant later 
moved to suppress certain evidence arguing that the artificial viewing aids constituted an 
unreasonable search without a judicial warrant. The court stated: "There can be no ques-
tion . . . that the protection recognized by Katz includes protection against unreasona-
ble visual intrusions. Visual intrusions can interfere with an individual's right to be left 
alone just as powerfully as the eavesdropping at issue in Katz." Id. at 1254 (citations 
omitted). 
See also People v. Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d 505, 511, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624, 627 (1970) 
(police officers used ten-power binoculars to observe defendant handling obscene materi-
als within office building suite where activity would not otherwise be observable by the 
naked eye; the test of validity of the surveillance held to turn on whether there was a 
"reasonable expectation of privacy and not upon the means used to view it"); People v. 
Chiochon, 23 Ill. App. 3d 363, 366, 319 N.E.2d 332, 335 (1974) ("We can find no distinc-
tion in law between overhearing conversations by means of electronic devices and observ-
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CCTV surveillance in public areas because courts would rarely 
find a reasonable expectation of privacy;78 in nonpublic areas, 
however, courts would. more likely find such an expectation. 
b. Plain view applied to CCTV surveillance. If a court finds 
that a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy then 
the plain view rule does not affect the result.79 Where the defen-
dant had no reasonable expectation of privacy, however, the 
plain view rule could be used to uphold the validity of the war-
rantless search. 80 In this regard, several distinctions can be 
drawn in support of the position that CCTV surveillance is not 
susceptible to application of the plain view rule. First, most sys-
tems in current operation maintain continuous twenty-four hour 
surveillance, whereas most cases to date have involved only rela-
tively short-term or periodic observation.81 This characteristic of 
ing a person's conduct by the use of binoculars"). See Note, Telescopic Sur.veillance as a 
Violation of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 72, at 712-715 (1978), which argues that 
Katz should apply with equal vigor to visual searches, in part because "visual surveil-
lance may be considered even more intrusive upon individual expectations of privacy 
than electronic eavesdropping." Id. at 711. 
Courts have also found a reasonable expectation of privacy where artificial illumina-
tion was used to obtain the plain view. See, e.g., LaDuke v. Castillo, 455 F. Supp. 209, 
211 (E.D. Wash. 1978) ("There could be no 'plain view' search of plaintiff's home, as it 
was allegedly too dark to view the inside of the premises without the aid of a flashlight 
. . . . Individuals enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in the confines of their home, 
and such privacy is protected by the fourth amendment from government intrusion."), 
Police helicopter surveillance cases illustrate the application of the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy standard to situations long governed solely by the plain view rule. For a 
discussion of how helicopters are used in law enforcement, see Comment, Police Helicop-
ter Surveillance, 15 AR1z. L. REV. 145, 146-49 (1973). Despite the widespread use of heli-
copter surveillance by law enforcement personnel, very few cases have involved the issue 
of inadmissibility of evidence as an improper search and seizure. In one such case, Peo-
ple v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973), the court rejected the state's 
argument that the helicopter surveillance was merely a plain view case, and granted the 
defendant's motion to suppress the evidence thus obtained. Id. at 542-43, 545, 108 Cal. 
Rptr. at 151, 153. 
In Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 115, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973), the court 
considered the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard in ruling on the admissi-
bility of evidence obtained by means of aerial helicopter surveillance: "Expectations of 
privacy are not earthbound. The Fourth Amendment guards the privacy of human activ-
ity from aerial no less than terrestrial invasion." Id. at 116, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 588. The 
court nevertheless found that the defendant's expectation of privacy was unreasonable 
since he could not have expected his marijuana crop to be hidden from an aerial view. Id. 
at 118, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 590. 
See also People v. Superior Court ex rel. Stroud, 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 
674 (1974), in which the court held that defendants had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their backyard from police helicopter surveillance. 
•• See Part II A 1 b supra for a discussion of the reasonable expectation of privacy 
· standard applied to CCTV used in public areas. 
•• See cases cited at note 77 supra. 
80 See cases cited at notes 75-76 supra. 
81 See, e.g., United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 
e 
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CCTV surveillance does not necessarily take it out of the per-
missible contours of the plain view rule. Courts would probably 
not abandon the rule even if actual physical observation were 
conducted in a continuous manner. Nonetheless, it is doubtful 
whether such continuous observation can be characterized as 
inadvertent. 82 
The videotape capability of CCTV does not invalidate use of 
the system on plain view grounds. Merely transforming a legally 
permissible observation by police into a permanent record fails 
to take CCTV surveillance outside of the plain view rule. 
Placing the camera unit in a position where nonpublic areas in 
addition to permissible public areas are observed will not permit 
the defendant to challenge the search's constitutionality based 
on the plain view rule alt~ough this distinction is important for 
determination of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Since this 
article concludes that the defendant in the hypothetical scenario 
presented earlier88 had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the 
plain view rule would not affect this result. 84 If a court deter-
mined, however, that the defendant's expectation of privacy was 
U.S. 936 (1974); Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 
U.S. 830 (1968); State v. Thompson, 196 Neb. 55, 241 N.W.2d 511 (1976); State v. Manly, 
85 Wash. 2d 120, 530 P.2d 306 (1975); People v. Chiochon, 23 Ill. App. 3d 363, 319 
N.E.2d 332 (1974). 
The continuous surveillance by CCTV is normally made by scanning the subject area. 
The camera unit is normally adjusted to provide the monitor operator with a wide angle 
of visibility and this entails use of the panning feature. See note 7 supra. There are, 
however, some systems which have fixed camera units. See TIME, supra note 13, at 15. 
81 For a discussion of inadvertence and its current standing in the lower courts see 
notes 61-62 and accompanying text supra; Note, "Plain View" - Anything But Plain; 
Coolidge Divides the Lower Courts, supra note 61, at 507-13. In addition to lower court 
division as to the requirement of inadvertence, these courts differ markedly as to the 
standard of inadvertence-that is, how inadvertent a search must be in order to qualify 
as a "plain view." See id. at 717. 
Where surveillance is as planned and deliberate as CCTV observation, it seems inaccu-
rate to argue that illegal activity was inadvertently discovered. However, because the 
CCTV system is presumably set up and operated without focusing upon one person or 
group, the activity which does fall within range of the camera lens can be considered 
inadvertent in the broad sense. See, e.g., United States v. Welsch, 446 F.2d 220 (10th 
Cir. 1971), where the court held that the inadvertence requirement means that the police 
had no sufficient pre-existing knowledge to permit iBBuance of a warrant. The Welsch 
definition of inadvertence would justify the use of CCTV surveillance based on the plain 
view rule. 
A situation can easily be analogized to CCTV surveillance in the context of the contin-
uous search characteristic. If three police officers maintained eight-hour shifts succes-
sively in one twenty-four hour period on the same street corner, the effect would be 
much the same. It is unlikely that plain view would be held inapplicable in such a scena-
rio because the officers would be where they have a legal right to be. See note 63 supra. 
•• See text at notes 29-34 and accompanying text supra. 
84 See note 77 and accompanying text supra. 
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not reasonable because he knowingly or carelessly exposed his 
activity to plain view,811 then the admissibility of the cocaine at 
defendant's trial would depend on whether the CCTV surveil-
lance can be upheld under the plain view doctrine. The police 
might argue as follows: the plain view rule pemitted the visual 
surveillance of defendant's property; the CCTV camera, as the 
police officer's "eye,"se was in a legal position;s7 and light ampli-
fication and magnification are within the plain view rule.88 In 
the hypothetical scenario if the court determined that the defen-
dant had no reasonable expectation of privacy, the plain view 
rule would uphold the validity of the police use of CCTV 
surveillance. 
B. The Constitutional Right of Privacy 
There is an inevitable spill-over effect resulting from the use 
of a CCTV surveillance system. Law-abiding citizens who have 
an apartment, home or office building within the magnification 
and tilt range of a CCTV system may not be willing to forego 
private activity for the sake of preventing street crime. Inciden-
tal surveilance of law-abiding citizens engaged in private, lawful 
activity presents a critical constitutional issue. · 
The constitutional right of privacy is an aggregate of many 
distinct rights specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights.89 
Since Griswold v. Connecticut, 90 the right of privacy has been 
•• See notes 75-76 and accompanying text supra. 
88 See notes 71-72 and accompanying text supra. 
87 See notes 63-64 and accompanying text supra. 
88 See note 76 and accompanying text supra . 
.. For a discussion of the constitutional basis of the right of privacy, see Clark, Consti· 
tutional Sources of the Penumbral Right to Privacy, 19 V1LL. L. REV. 833 (1974); Ervin, 
Privacy and the Constitution, 50 NC. L. REv. 1016 (1972); Griswold, The Right to be Let 
Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 216 (1960); McKay, Mapp v. Ohio, The Exclusionary Rule and 
the Right of Privacy, 15 AR1z. L. REV. 327 (1973); Parker, Definition of Privacy, 27 
RUTGERS L. REv. 275 (1974); Symposium on the Griswold Case and the Right of Privacy, 
64 MICH. L. REV. 197 (1965); NOTE, Formalism, Legal Realism and Constitutionally Pro-
tected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REv. 945 (1977); 
Note, The Constitutional Right of Privacy: An Examination, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 263 
(1964); Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 670 (1973). 
80 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold the Supreme Court held that the rights guaranteed 
in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments form together the "penum-
bra" of a constitutional right. 
In Monell v. Department of Social Serva., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Court determined 
that local governments and municipal corporations are subject to liability under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for violating a person's federally protected rights. This statute provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Tenitory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citi-
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subsequently extended to First Amendment, sexual, and family 
activities. 91 
There are two principal roadblocks to the effective use of the 
right of privacy against the spill-over effect of CCTV surveil-
lance of nonpublic activity. The first is the observed citizens' 
need to establish a justiciable controversy; the second is the nar-
row scope of the constitutional right of privacy. Both of these 
factors pose obstacles to the citizen plaintiff suing police for 
monitoring his private, legal activity. 
In order to obtain injunctive relief from government activity 
which allegedly violates one's constitutional rights~ the plaintiff 
must show concrete evidence of actual injury or the likelihood of 
actual harm in the future so as to present a justiciable contro-
versy. 92 Since the injury must be in the form of physical harm or 
mental anguish, the CCTV plaintiff would at least need to show 
that he or she has experienced extraordinary mental or economic 
suffering as a result of the surveillance-an extremely difficult 
fact to prove. 98 
zen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The extension of the right of privacy to unwarranted CCTV 
observations would provide the plaintiff with a cause of action under this federal statute. 
01 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (a person has the right to receive infor-
mation and ideas, including pornography, in the privacy of his home); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion during early pregnancy); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 
(1973) (same). 
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Court upheld the right to use contra-
ceptives by unmarried persons: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of 
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget 
a child." Id. at 453 (emphasis in original). 
See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to interracial marriage); Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923) (right to decide child's upbringing and education). 
91 See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), where the Court refused to enjoin military 
surveillance of the respondents because they could show no "specific present objective 
harm or a threat of specific future harm." Id. at 13-14. In Laird the Court relied upon 
the test for justiciability laid out in Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937): 
It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke the 
judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must 
show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct 
injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he was merely a 
general interest common to all members of the public. 
See also Donohoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971); Comment, Right of Pri-
vacy-Direct Injury Must Be Shown Before a Court May Grant Relief From General 
Governmental Surveillance, 8 U. RICH. L. REv. 351, 353-57 (1974). 
•• See Comment, supra note 92, at 357. The author, however, argues that the require-
ment of "direct injury" fails to reflect adequately the dangers of government observation 
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The Supreme Court and the lower courts have thus far ex-
tended the right of privacy to family, sexual, and First Amend-
ment pursuits94 but have left unprotected other fundamentally 
private activities not within those parameters. H Lower courts 
have rigidly held to the strict substantive limitations on the con-
stitutional right of privacy announced by the Supreme Court.96 
Unless the Supreme Court significantly expands the current ap-
plication of the constitutional right of privacy to additional ar-
eas, the doctrine will be of little use to a plaintiff seeking to en-
join police CCTV surveillance of activity in the home. 
It would be equally unwise for a criminal defendant to rely on 
the right of privacy to deter or exclude police CCTV surveil-
lance.97 The Supreme Court supported this contention by basing 
the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard upon the 
of private activity: 
Present encroachments on privacy inflicted by general governmental surveillance 
represent so grave a danger to constitutional guarantees that society should not 
be forced to remain without adequate protection while courts capable of provid-
ing protection fail to do so. If the right of privacy is to be enjoyed citizens must 
be able to regulate the access of others to knowledge about their personal lives. 
Id. at 357. 
See also Donohoe v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972) (plaintiff unable to establish 
"justiciable injury" from local police surveillance of public meetings); ACLU v. West-
moreland, 323 F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (plaintiff failed to prove "chilling effect" on 
freedom of speech as a direct injury resulting from Army spying); Anderson v. Sills, 56 
N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970) (showing of direct injury caused by police reporting system 
of potential civil disorders held too speculative) . 
.. See note 91 and accompanying text supra . 
.. See, e.g., California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (Constitution does 
not prohibit all requirements that information be made available to the government); 
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (zoning ordinance restricting land use 
to one-family dwellings does not infringe upon "non-family's" "fundamental" right of 
privacy); Tosh v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 482 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1973) (constitu-
tional right to privacy does not prohibit a state agency from furnishing arrest informa-
tion to those who present a legitimate need for it); Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110, 
113-14 (D. Conn. 1966) ("Thus far, only the basic core elements of privacy ... are 
clearly constitutionally protected. Protection does not extend to all possible ramifications 
of privacy.") But see Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157 (Colo. 1972) (even without legisla-
tion, judicial control may be used to protect a citizen from what might develop upon its 
facts to be an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy). See also Note, The 
Constitutional Right of Privacy; supra note 89, at 284-94 (1974). 
" The most common response to a proposed extension of the privacy theory advanced 
in the lower courts is, "[t]hus far only the most intimate phases of personal life have 
been held to be thus constitutionally protected." Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520, 524-
25 (2d Cir. 1973). See, e.g., Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Gray, 480 F.2d 326 (2d 
Cir. 1973); Donohoe v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972); Note, supra note 94, at 294. 
For an analysis of the civil remedy in tort for electronic surveillance, see Note, Torts: 
Protection of Individual Privacy from Electronic Surveillance, 23 OKLA. L. REV. 223 
(1970) . 
.., See generally Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study 
of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 968 (1968). 
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Fourth Amendment's unreasonable search and seizure provision 
rather than the broader right of privacy, thereby indicating that 
the Fourth Amendment provides the clearer standard and more 
effective means for redress of harm. 
C. The First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and 
Association 
The principal danger from government actions which inhibit 
free speech and association is the indirect or "chilling effect" re-
sulting from uncertainty as to what is prohibited activity.•• A 
state law is constitutionally prohibited if it forces individuals to 
conform their free speech and association activity only to what 
is clearly permitted by the statute.•• 
The Supreme Court has framed a balancing test to weigh the 
interest and need for the state to regulate certain conduct 
against the extent to which the state statute interferes with an 
individual's First Amendment rights.100 As long as the state can 
demonstrate a sufficiently compellin'g interest, government re-
strictions which may inhibit free speech and association are al-
•• See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264-66 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 
U.S. 479 (1965). The Dombrowski Court explained: "Because of the sensitive nature of 
constitutionally protected expression, we have not required that all those subject to over-
broad regulations risk prosecution to test their rights. For free expression-of transcen-
dental value to all society and not merely to those exercising their rights-might be the 
loser." Id. at 486. 
The courts have consistently ruled against any governmental action which threatens 
the free exercise of First Amendment rights. Even actions which indirectly inhibit free 
speech or association are prohibited. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. lliinois State Bar 
Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967): 
The First Amendment would, however, be a hollow promise if it left government 
free to destroy or erode its guarantees by indirect restraints so long as no law is 
passed that prohibits free speech . . . as such. We have therefore repeatedly 
held that laws which actually affect the exercise of these vital rights cannot be 
sustained merely because they were erected for the purpose of dealing with some 
evil without the State's legislative competence, or even because the laws do in 
fact provide a helpful means of dealing with such an evil. 
Id. at 222 (emphasis added). 
•• See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 
U.S. 360 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
100 In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51 (1971), the Supreme Court stated: 
[T]he existence of a "chilling effect," even in the area of First Amendment 
rights, has never been considered a sufficient basis, in and of itself, for prohibit-
ing state action. Where a statute does not directly abridge free speech, but--
while regulating a subject within the State's power-tends to have the inciden-
tal effect of inhibiting First Amendment rights, it is well settled that the statute 
can be upheld if the effect on speech is minor in relation to the need for control 
· of the conduct and the lack of alternative means for doing so. 
(emphasis added). 
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lowed. 101 The outcome of the balancing test in these First 
Amendment cases thus depends significantly upon how much 
weight is assigned to the compelling state interest. 
CCTV surveillance would be subject to First Amendment at-
tack in the following hypothetical scenario. A political demon-
stration involving a socially unpopular cause is held in a public 
park or city street subject to CCTV surveillance. The plaintiffs 
claim that the use of CCTV constitutes a disincentive for at-
tendance by those fearful of government surveillance and re-
quest injunctive relief and damages. Under current case law, 
however, such a claim would probably fail because the use of 
camera surveillance would be compared to past methods of gov-
ernment surveillance using photographs and undercover 
agents. 102 The greatest obstacle for defendants in the area of 
CCTV surveillance is that such observation normally occurs in 
clearly public areas such that any member of the public would 
easily be able to view the activity. 103 
101 In Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 408 U.S. 1 (1971), a group of 
political activists filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to hold the Army's under-
cover surveillances of their activity unconstitutional and sought an injunction to prohibit 
future surveillance. The appellants claimed, inter alia, that the Army's undercover sur-
veillance operation created a "chilling effect" which abridged their First Amendment 
rights. Although the court held that the Army had a "legal basis for the collection of 
intelligence information relevant to its constitutional and statutory mission," id. at 956, 
the opinion noted in dictum that such surveillance by non-military civilian criminal law 
enforcement agencies is also constitutionally permissible. Id. at 957. 
10
• The plaintiffs' argument would be unpersuasive given the insignificant difference 
between CCTV and photography. In Donohoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 
1971), the plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin police from photographing persons participat-
ing in political demonstrations. The plaintiffs contended that police photographers had 
"a 'chilling effect' upon their presence, as well as on others who may [have wished] to 
participate." Id. at 309-10. The court rejected this arg~ment and determined "that the 
practices of the Richmond police as heretofore described are not only permissible and 
constitutional, but they are also commendable and should be encouraged." Id. at 311 
(emphasis added). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, Donohoe v. Duling, 465 
F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972), relying upon the lack of "justiciable controversy" doctrine. 
See also Clark, Constitutional Sources of the Penumbral Right to Privacy, 19 VILL. L. 
REv. 833, 841-55 (1974) (discussing the protection of political privacy); Meisel, Political 
Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 35 U. Pin. L. REv. 53 (1973); Note, First and 
Fourteenth Amendments - Right to Privacy, 43 TENN. L. REV. 689 (1976). For a general 
discussion of civil liability for nonconsenting photography, see Cavallo, Photography: 
Law in Focus, 14 TRIAL 22 (1978). 
10
• There is currently no statutory or case law to prevent law enforcement officers from 
photographing people in public places. See Note, supra note 5, at 195 & 195 n.278. See 
also Anderson v. Sills, 106 N.J. Super. 545 (1969), rev'd and remanded, 56 N.J. 210, 265 
A.2d 678 (1970), where the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the state has a legiti-
mate interest in scrutinizing criminal suspects which outweighs the First Amendment 
objections of the suspect. The appellate court held: "[T]he constitutional doctrine re-
quires that we consider any burden placed upon First Amendment rights that might 
reasonably be expected to interfere or to prevent their exercise as constituting an imper-
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Ill. PROPOSED REGULATIONS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF 
CCTV SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS 
Existing case law does not adequately limit police use of 
CCTV surveillance. 10" Even though these systems have success-
fully deterred street crime, their potentially great abuse war-
rants specific limitations even absent constitutional considera-
tions.1011 Constitutional standards, however, are the minimum 
standards which users of CCTV are required to meet. The inad-
equacy of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in affording 
a proper remedy and the difficulty courts have in formulating 
precise regulations indicate th_at statutory law and administra-
tive regulations are more appropriate means of controlling 
CCTV use. 
The first consideration is which lawmaking body is best able 
to implement the necessary restrictions on urban police use of 
CCTV systems. The LEAA has the power to attach reasonable 
conditions to a state's use of its grant funds106 and the LEAA 
must evaluate the effectiveness and impact of that use in order 
to provide continued funding. 107 LEAA normally channels funds 
missible infringement on those rights." 106 N.J. Super. at 554. But the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey reversed, holding that no First Amendment issue was involved, since the case 
did not concern a statute which would have imposed criminal sanctions for its violation. 
56 N.J. at 220, 265 A.2d at 687. 
1 
.. According to one government official, "Generally, no legal limitations on electronic 
surveillance of large public areas exist. The challenge is wide open." Note, supra note 7, 
at 152 (citing Barkan, Big Brother Won't Wait Until 1984, GUARDIAN 2, Feb. 2, 1972, at 
3). 
1
•• For an account of the "psychologically taxing" effect on observed individuals by an 
authority figure. see A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 58-63 (1970). 
108 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3739 (1976). 42 U.S.C. § 3733(a) provides in pertinent part: 
(a) The Administration shall make grants under this chapter to a State plan-
ning agency if such agency has on file with the Administration an approved com-
prehensive State plan . . . . No State plan shall be approved as comprehensive 
unless the Administration finds that the new plan provides for the allocation of 
adequate assistance to deal with law enforcement and criminal justice problems 
in areas characterized by both high crime incidence and high law enforcement 
and criminal justice activity. No State plan shall be approved as comprehensive, 
unless it includes a comprehensive program, whether or not funded under this 
chapter, for the improvement of juvenile justice .... [It must] (3) adequately 
take into account the needs and requests of the units of general local govern-
ment in the State and encourage local initiative in the development of programs 
and projects for improvements in law enforcement and criminal justice. . .. 
[It must] (5) incorporate innovations and advanced techniques and contain a 
comprehensive outline of priorities for the improvement and coordination of all 
aspects of law enforcement and criminal justice, . . . . 
1
•• Id. § 3733(b) (1976). This section provides: 
(b) Prior to its approval of any State plan, the Administration shall evaluate 
its likely effectiveness and impact. No approval shall be given to any State plan 
unless and until the Administration makes an affirmative finding in writing that 
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to state agencies for use in specific ways.108 Therefore, where 
LEAA funds are used in whole or part by states to purchase sur-
veillance equipment the LEAA may impose stringent regulations 
on the states as to how these systems are used. Since nearly all 
CCTV surveillance projects have thus far been funded substan-
tially or entirely by the LEAA, this approach is likely to be 
effective. 
Federal statutory treatment of CCTV could be more far-
reaching than the administrative response109 because a state is 
not bound by Department of Justice regulations concerning re-
mote camera surveillance if that state did not rely on LEAA 
funding for the purchase or maintenance of its surveillance 
equipment. This approach, however, appears less likely to be 
sustained in light of a recent Supreme Court decision curtailing 
Congress' commerce power where it directly interferes with a 
state's freedom to structure its integral operations.110 
Even without the capability of reaching all local police use of 
CCTV surveillance, Congress may enact procedural laws which: 
(1) prohibit the introduction into federal courts of any evidence 
which was seized with the aid of a non-federally approved CCTV 
system; and (2) disallow any testimony by the monitor operator 
based on observation of criminal activity on such unapproved 
systems. 
State legislatures could adopt their own restrictions on CCTV 
use. Though this has the obvious potential for different stan-
dards of protection, the success of uniform state laws may carry 
such plan reflects a determined effort to improve the quality of law enforcement 
and criminal justice throughout the State and that, on the basis of the evalua-
tion made by the Administration, such plan is likely to contribute effectively to 
an improvement of law enforcement and criminal justice in the State and make 
a significant and effective contribution to the State's efforts to deal with 
crime .... 
108 See, e.g., LEAA Grant # 70-DF-170, where the LEAA gave the Florida Inter-
Agency Law Enforcement Planning Council $150,000 to create a selective enforcement 
unit of ten videotape-equipped vehicles in Tampa, Florida. The LEAA granted $50,000 
to Washington, D.C., for purposes of implementing the Mayor's Command Center Tele-
vision System. For an additional discussion of the LEAA's role in funding local police 
departments' use of modern law enforcement technology, see Goulden, Tooling Up for 
Repression: The Cops Hit the Jackpot, THE NATION, Nov. 23, 1970, at 520. 
'
09 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 
(1941). 
110 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In Usery, the Supreme 
Court held that Congress cannot impair certain essential attributes of state sovereignty. 
Id. at 851-52. The Court expressly mentioned a state's ability to provide police protec-
tion as falling within those "services . . . which the States have traditionally afforded 
their citizens." Id. at 839. 
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over to such regulations. m 
Another possible means of restricting CCTV use is by consti-
tutional amendment.112 Although the difficulty of refining pre-
cise standards by the process of judicial decision-making would 
remain, the constitutional amendment route would indicate a 
strong commitment to personal privacy whether ratified on the 
federal or state level. The amendment might provide "The right 
of the people to be free from clandestine electronic surveillance 
by the State shall not be abridged other than by a judicial 
search warrant, showing probable cause, by oath or affirmation, 
that the observed party has committed or is committing a crimi-
nal act." Although the language is broad, courts would hopefully 
guard more zealously the freedom of individual against unwar-
ranted governmental surveillance, filling in the gaps which such 
general language inevitably leaves. 
No matter which method of implementation is chosen, a com-
prehensive licensing procedure should apply to the use of any 
type of CCTV surveillance system. Such a license should be is-
sued to police departments by either a federal or state licensing 
authority only on the basis of a demonstrated need.118 In order 
III The key to successful adoption of a uniform state law is approval by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws [hereinafter cited as 
N.C.C.U.S.L.]. Uniform state laws normally deal with important subject matters and are 
drafted with great care such that they take on an importance not normally equalled by 
other state acts. In addition, the acts serve to maintain the federal-state structure be-
cause "[w]ithout them, interstate chaos and confusion would inevitably produce a popu-
lar demand for federal legislation in many legal areas that are traditionally within the 
function of state law." Leflar, Maurice H. Merrill and Uniform State Law, 25 OKLA. L. 
REV. 501, 502 (1972). 
Uniform state laws which have been approved by the N.C.C.U.S.L. include: 
Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal 
Proceedings (1949); Anti-Discrimination Act (1968); Code of Military Justice 
(1963); Uniform Commercial Code (1961); Amendments (1970); Consumer Credit 
Code (1969); Criminal Extradition Act (1949); Deceptive Trade Practices Act 
(1965); Declaratory Judgments Act (1961); Fraudulent Conveyances Act (1965); 
Limited Partnership Act (1951); Narcotic Drug Act (1953); Negotiable Instru-
ments Act (1909); Partnership Act (1955); Perjury Act (1965); and Post-Convic-
tion Procedure Act (1970). 
Id. at 504-05. 
112 But see A. WESTIN, supra note 105, at 394-95, where Professor Westin argues 
against a constitutional amendment for the protection of privacy. He notes that the ad· 
vantage to such an amendment would be that direct federal regulation of state police 
practices and evidentiary procedures would be permitted. Id. 
113 Unless there is a significant crime problem in the proposed surveillance area, the 
license should not be granted. Above this threshold, a community would be free to im-
plement CCTV surveillance. A threshold is needed to prevent the majority from overrid-
ing individual rights in the absence of a compelling interest in crime prevention. The 
privacy rights of individuals would be subordinate to the majority desire for CCTV pro· 
tection where there is a street crime problem. This interest-balancing is necessary to 
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to procure the license, a police department should have to sub-
mit a detailed proposal as to the intended use of the CCTV sys-
tem and its expected effectiveness in deterring crime in a given 
area. m Licenses should only be granted for remote cameras in 
areas which have significant street crime problems or where 
there is substantial likelihood of such street crime. m A public 
hearing should be held before the final issuance of the license in 
order to solicit public comments and suggestions. The law 
should have a provision for a community veto by the neighbor-
ing merchants and residents if there are widespread objections 
to CCTV use.118 
The law should specify certain technological restrictions which 
the equipment must have in order for a system to be licensed.117 
The prohibition of videotaping would avoid one of the greatest 
objections to CCTV surveillance. Without taping, the potential 
for abuse by doctoring film for political embarrassment, compre-
hensive citizen location-registration, and deceptive courtroom 
use is reduced. Furthermore, the licensee should be required to 
post notice of CCTV surveillance. Such notices should be con-
spicuously placed and the camera units must be clearly 
identified. 118 
In order to retain its license a police department should peri-
odically be required to submit to the CCTV licensing authority a 
report detailing the past period's use of the equipment and any 
provide constitutional protection while also giving a broad control to the majority. 
"' These effectiveness tests could be modeled on those used in the Mt. Vernon pro-
ject. See note 7 supra. 
"" The determination of a "significant" crime problem is best left to a state or local 
licensing board. See note 113 supra. 
11• The veto would be similar to a neighborhood veto of liquor establishment licensing. 
The voting unit might consist of a political ward or township. A school district may, in 
some instances, be an appropriate voting unit. Included within the idea of a neighbor-
hood or community veto is a provision for a community recall if the neighborhood so 
desired to revoke the department's license for that surveillance area. 
117 The tilt and rotational range of camera units could be restricted to avoid the possi-
bility of observing essentially private areas such as inside windows of apartments and 
homes. Another technological limitation might be on the telescopic capability of the sys-
tem. There is no overiding justification for being able to see what a pedestrian is reading 
or saying. Light amplification should be retained because of the high incidence of street 
crime at night. Within a specified distance, for example, thirty feet, the telescopic cap-
ability of the camera unit could be rendered inoperable. This would prevent unjustified 
personal intrusions while still permitting long-range observation. 
111 Posting notice would serve as a further deterrent to criminal activity in the surveil-
lance area. 
In the private sector, many supermarkets, banks, and other establishments have in-
creased public awareness of their security cameras by taking advantage of the human 
desire to appear on·television. Monitor units could, accordingly, be placed in the vicinity 
of CCTV cameras to familiarize the public with the system. 
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significant benefits arising from its operation. As a further con-
trol, the authority should have full responsibility for investigat-
ing all complaints. Moreover, the authority should employ in-
spectors who would make unannounced visits to monitoring 
stations and camera posts to verify compliance. 
Finally, stiff penalties should be imposed for violations of the 
regulations in addition to suspension or revocation of the police 
department's license.119 In appropriate circumstances, a plaintiff 
could make use of a statutory provision in the regulations grant-
ing a civil action to any person whose constitutional rights have 
been violated. 120 
CONCLUSION 
CCTV surveillance operations by police deter street crime and 
aid in the detection and apprehension of criminal suspects. Nev-
ertheless, the use of this advanced technology should not be ex-
empt from the constitutional prohibitions formulated during a 
less advanced era. If civil liberties are to remain strong, the 
courts and legislatures must not allow the modern technology to 
circumvent current statutory and case law safeguards. 
This article has traced the current constitutional doctrines po-
tentially applicable to police use of CCTV surveillance and, in 
applying the doctrines to a hypothetical scenario, has concluded 
that there are some uses of CCTV to which no existing law ap-
plies. CCTV surveillance is too beneficial a tool to be prohibited 
altogether, but the harms of its unlimited use outweigh that 
benefit. A compromise is necessary: CCTV surveillance should 
be used, but only if tightly regulated. Then, and only then, can 
its significant advantages be obtained, while at the same time 
safeguarding the fundamental rights of the citizenry. 
-Gary C. Robb 
119 In discussing appropriate penalties of wiretapping statues by federal officials, Pro-
fessor Westin has suggested that criminal sanctions be imposed against violators with 
imprisonment for one to three years and that evidence obtained as a result of the illegal 
act be suppressed. A. WESTIN, supra note 105, at 393. 
120 See note 91 supra. Although the plaintiffs whose constitutional rights had been 
violated may have a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), a specific statutory 
grant providing a cause of action for CCTV abuses by police would provide more certain 
coverage. Such a statute would avoid the uncertainties of applying the civil rights statute 
to actions against the sovereign. The statute could provide for an injunction and dam-
ages for proven violations of the regulations. The possibility of civil liability would also 
encourage police departments to comply more carefully with the licensing and opera-
tional regulations. 
